tao-finetune-clip
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process user-provided datasets (images and captions) for model training and inference, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests external data from image directories, caption folders, and shard lists specified in the configuration (e.g.,
dataset.train.datasets). - Boundary markers: Data paths are handled via structured YAML and JSON configuration files, but instructions do not mandate specific isolation or sanitization for potential instructions embedded in the captions.
- Capability inventory: The agent utilizes the
Bashtool to executeclipCLI commands and can write output to a user-defined results directory. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization logic described for filtering or validating the textual content of captions before they are processed by the training or inference containers.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation correctly references official NVIDIA container images hosted on the
nvcr.ioregistry (e.g.,nvcr.io/nvidia/tao/tao-toolkit:6.26.3-deploy). These references target well-known services associated with the skill's author and are documented neutrally. - [SAFE]: The skill correctly identifies a security consideration regarding PyTorch 2.6 checkpoint loading (
TORCH_FORCE_NO_WEIGHTS_ONLY_LOAD=1) and explicitly instructs the user not to enable this override for untrusted checkpoints, following established security best practices.
Audit Metadata