tao-mine-aoi-images
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
docker runto execute image processing tasks. Invocations include high-privilege flags such as--gpus all,--ipc=host, and-v $WORKSPACE:$WORKSPACEfor host filesystem access. This is standard and required for the skill's GPU-accelerated data science purpose. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow pulls the
tao_toolkit.data_servicesimage (resolved from a localversions.yaml) and the officialalpineimage from Docker Hub. These downloads are from trusted or well-known sources and are necessary for the workflow. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
hooks/mining-package.shscript automates the collection of Claude Code session logs (.jsonl) and local settings (settings.json) to include them in the final mining report package. This data remains on the local filesystem and is intended for auditability of the mining iteration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted data from
.parquetfiles and tool outputs via automation hooks. - Ingestion points:
target_embeddings.parquet,source_embeddings.parquet,mined.parquet,Mining_Report.md, and tool-use stdout/stderr. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use explicit delimiters to isolate data from instructions in these inputs.
- Capability inventory: Extensive capabilities including
docker run(root access), host file writes, and arbitrary bash execution. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic validation via regex and schema checks in the hooks but lacks robust sanitization for embedded instructions in processed data.
Audit Metadata