modelopt-benchmark-model-kernels

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/benchmark_via_builtin.py uses subprocess.Popen to execute flashinfer_benchmark.py within a directory specified by the user via the --flashinfer_repo argument. This allows the execution of arbitrary code contained within the targeted directory if a user provides an untrusted path.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In scripts/benchmark_model.py, the _load_meta_model function exposes the --trust-remote-code parameter of the Hugging Face transformers library. When enabled, this feature allows the execution of arbitrary Python code defined in the model repository. The SKILL.md file contains a mitigation instruction: 'Do not enable --trust-remote-code without explicit approval; pin --revision <commit> when it is needed.'
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted model configuration data from the Hugging Face Hub, creating an attack surface where maliciously crafted model metadata could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/benchmark_model.py via AutoConfig.from_pretrained.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in prompt interpolation for derived shapes.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via subprocess, file system writes to a work directory, and network access to Hugging Face.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses shlex.join to safely construct command strings for display and execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 13, 2026, 11:12 AM