modelopt-benchmark-model-kernels
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/benchmark_via_builtin.pyusessubprocess.Popento executeflashinfer_benchmark.pywithin a directory specified by the user via the--flashinfer_repoargument. This allows the execution of arbitrary code contained within the targeted directory if a user provides an untrusted path. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/benchmark_model.py, the_load_meta_modelfunction exposes the--trust-remote-codeparameter of the Hugging Facetransformerslibrary. When enabled, this feature allows the execution of arbitrary Python code defined in the model repository. TheSKILL.mdfile contains a mitigation instruction: 'Do not enable--trust-remote-codewithout explicit approval; pin--revision <commit>when it is needed.' - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted model configuration data from the Hugging Face Hub, creating an attack surface where maliciously crafted model metadata could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/benchmark_model.pyviaAutoConfig.from_pretrained. - Boundary markers: Absent in prompt interpolation for derived shapes.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
subprocess, file system writes to a work directory, and network access to Hugging Face. - Sanitization: The skill uses
shlex.jointo safely construct command strings for display and execution.
Audit Metadata