modelopt-ptq
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to parse import statements directly from model source files (
modeling_*.py) usinggrepand subsequently install those packages viapip. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions include cloning the HuggingFace
transformerssource code from GitHub and installing it locally, as well as importing Docker containers from the Nvidia Container Registry. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the
trust_remote_code=Trueflag when loading HuggingFace models and configurations, which allows for the execution of arbitrary Python scripts included in the model's repository. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Uses
importlib.import_moduleto load Python modules based on strings constructed from the model's configuration metadata (cfg.model_type), allowing for dynamic code loading from computed paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting and processing untrusted external data (model checkpoints, configuration files, and custom scripts) that are used to drive subsequent shell commands and code execution.
- Ingestion points:
config.json,modeling_*.py, and HuggingFace model repositories. - Boundary markers: None identified to separate untrusted model instructions from agent logic.
- Capability inventory:
pip install,enroot import,sbatchjob submission, and arbitrary Python execution viatrust_remote_code. - Sanitization: No verification or sanitization of the model's code or configuration is performed prior to execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches Docker images from
nvcr.ioand source code/models from HuggingFace repositories.
Audit Metadata