modelopt-speculative-decoding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of training and benchmarking pipelines via the
tools/launcher/launch.pyscript and various shell wrappers (e.g.,dflash_online_training.sh,vllm_smoke_test.sh). These are standard operations for machine learning development within the provided project structure.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a pipeline that ingests external datasets for model training, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Training data is loaded from
.jsonlfiles (e.g.,train.jsonl) generated during data synthesis or provided by the user. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes Jinja2 chat templates (e.g.,
chat_template_train.jinja) which include specific tokens like{% generation %}to delineate assistant responses and focus loss calculation. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including executing shell commands via
uv run, submitting Slurm jobs, writing artifacts to shared storage (/scratchspace), and initiating network services for model serving (vLLM). - Sanitization: The skill relies on structured input formats and template-based masking (
answer_only_loss) rather than explicit string sanitization.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation references thetrust_remote_codeconfiguration parameter, which is a standard requirement for loading custom model architectures in the Hugging Face and vLLM ecosystems. The skill correctly identifies this as a per-model adjustment rather than a default behavior, providing context for its necessity in specific architectural scenarios.
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