speculative-decoding

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves the agent parsing and summarizing external data sources, which presents a potential surface for indirect instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze experiment logs (*.out, *.log) and task artifacts in review-logs.md, triage.md, and validate.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary warnings are provided for parsing log content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes uv run launch.py for job execution and standard system utilities including find, tail, grep, ls, du, and test for file system and log interactions.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping of log content before the agent generates reports or summaries for the user.
  • [SAFE]: The skill's use of configuration knobs like trust_remote_code is explicitly documented as a necessary step for specific model architectures (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts or custom models). The instructions provide clear guidance on how and where to apply these flags across different pipeline stages.
  • [SAFE]: All referenced tools (uv, vLLM, TRT-LLM) and platforms (Hugging Face, arXiv) are industry-standard resources for the declared purpose of model optimization and research.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 08:06 PM