speculative-decoding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves the agent parsing and summarizing external data sources, which presents a potential surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze experiment logs (*.out, *.log) and task artifacts in
review-logs.md,triage.md, andvalidate.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary warnings are provided for parsing log content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
uv run launch.pyfor job execution and standard system utilities includingfind,tail,grep,ls,du, andtestfor file system and log interactions. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping of log content before the agent generates reports or summaries for the user.
- [SAFE]: The skill's use of configuration knobs like
trust_remote_codeis explicitly documented as a necessary step for specific model architectures (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts or custom models). The instructions provide clear guidance on how and where to apply these flags across different pipeline stages. - [SAFE]: All referenced tools (uv, vLLM, TRT-LLM) and platforms (Hugging Face, arXiv) are industry-standard resources for the declared purpose of model optimization and research.
Audit Metadata