nvidia-kaggle-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
kagglecommand-line tool via thesubprocessmodule inscripts/submission_quota.pyandscripts/upload_dataset.py. These executions are parameterized using argument lists rather than shell strings, which prevents shell-level injection. The capabilities are aligned with the skill's stated purpose and permissions.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted data from Kaggle (e.g., infetch_competition_info.py,discussion_ingest.py, andkernel_read.py). \n - Ingestion points: Data enters via API and CLI calls fetching competition details, forum posts, and kernel source.\n
- Boundary markers: The agent renders content into markdown sections, though explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data are primarily handled by the LLM's own safety guardrails.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to run shell commands (Kaggle CLI), perform network operations, and write to the local filesystem.\n
- Sanitization: Content is cleaned via
html_to_markdownandsanitize_cli_output, which strips control characters and ANSI escape sequences to prevent terminal spoofing.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: During initialization, the skill downloads several official and well-known Python packages from PyPI (httpx,kaggle,kagglesdk,nbformat,pydantic,python-dotenv,rich). These are required for interaction with the Kaggle platform and are treated as trusted dependencies.
Audit Metadata