cdf-autonomous-vehicle-dataset-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides instructions in
references/airflow-direct-api.mdthat usecurlto transmit sensitive authentication credentials (AIRFLOW_TOKEN,AIRFLOW_USERNAME,AIRFLOW_PASSWORD) to a user-supplied URL variable (AIRFLOW_URL). If the agent is tricked into using an attacker-controlled URL, this would result in credential exfiltration.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands includingcurl,jq, andkubectlto perform its tasks. These tools are used for network communication, JSON processing, and cluster resource inspection respectively, as shown inreferences/airflow-direct-api.md.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points: Untrusted user input is accepted via the
cosmos.promptfield defined inSKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: Absent; user-provided prompts are not wrapped in delimiters or accompanied by instructions to ignore embedded commands. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill's scripts in
references/airflow-direct-api.mdperform network operations (curl) and execute cluster commands (kubectl). \n - Sanitization: Partial; while
jqis used to safely encode the prompt into a JSON payload, there is no filtering or validation of the prompt's content to prevent malicious instructions from reaching the downstream video generation model.
Audit Metadata