earth2studio-create-prognostic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's code templates in
references/skeleton-template.pyandreferences/method-templates.py, as well as the implementation inevals/targets/eval_2_target.py, usetorch.loadwithweights_only=False. This is a known security risk in PyTorch that allows the execution of arbitrary code during the unpickling of model checkpoints. If an agent loads a malicious model from an untrusted source, this could lead to system compromise. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The main workflow defined in
SKILL.md(Step 0) requires the agent to fetch a reference inference script from a user-provided URL or local path. This introduces unverified external content into the agent's workspace. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The validation steps (Steps 10 and 11 in
SKILL.mdandreferences/validation-guide.md) instruct the agent to run 'vanilla' third-party scripts and comparison scripts usinguv run python. This represents the execution of remote code fetched during Step 0. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several powerful CLI tools and shell commands, including
uv run,pytest,make,git, andpip install, for dependency management, testing, and environment setup. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted third-party scripts.
- Ingestion points: Reference inference scripts fetched from external URLs in
SKILL.md(Step 0). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the analysis phase.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
uv run), write files, and load Python objects (torch.load). - Sanitization: The skill does not prescribe any content validation or sanitization for the fetched scripts before they are analyzed or executed.
Audit Metadata