improve-cutile-kernel-perf
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requests high autonomy, explicitly instructing the agent to "do not pause to ask user feedback" once the experiment loop starts. This reduces human oversight over the modification and execution of code.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests untrusted kernel source code from the
src/tilegym/directory and executes it viapytestto verify correctness. - Ingestion points: Reads kernel files under
src/tilegym/suites/orsrc/tilegym/ops/(specified inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. No instructions are provided to delimit or ignore embedded instructions within the source files.
- Capability inventory: Includes
git,python -m pytest(code execution),pip install, andtileiras(compiler). - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is designed to parse, modify, and execute the content of the files directly.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements an iterative experimentation loop that modifies Python source files and executes them. This includes a "Creative Optimization Plan" (Optimization L) where the agent is encouraged to generate and apply custom, non-templated logic to the codebase.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
ir-dump-guide.mddocumentation instructs the agent to install thecuda-tilepackage viapip. While this appears to be a legitimate vendor-associated package, runtime installation of external dependencies is a privileged operation that could be abused. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill involves a complex toolchain including
tileirasfor bytecode compilation andcuobjdumpfor SASS analysis. The agent executes these tools on generated artifacts, creating a path for code execution based on processed data.
Audit Metadata