tao-run-inference-service
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data (text prompts and sampling parameters) which is subsequently processed by an inference microservice.
- Ingestion points: User-provided messages and configuration fields in the request body as defined in
references/request.yaml. - Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
docker,kubectl,ssh), performs network requests (urllib.request), and maintains a local service registry (/tmp/tao-inf-ms-state.json). - Boundary markers: The skill employs standard OpenAI/vLLM chat completion schemas but does not define explicit delimiters to isolate user-provided content within the request structure.
- Sanitization: Employs
shlex.quoteto sanitize user inputs when constructing shell commands for container execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Generates and executes shell commands to manage container lifecycles on various platforms using
docker run,kubectl, andsshfor remote management. - Commands are constructed using sanitized user inputs such as
job_idandnetwork_arch. - Note: Uses
umask 0before container execution, which results in world-writable permissions for any files created by the service within the container's context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches container images from the NVIDIA Container Registry (
nvcr.io) and model weights from the HuggingFace Hub. - These downloads target well-known and trusted vendor-related services necessary for the skill's functionality.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Dynamically generates and executes Python and shell snippets at runtime to facilitate job payload construction, service registry management, and readiness checks.
- This mechanism incorporates user-defined parameters such as model paths and architecture choices into executable logic.
Audit Metadata