tao-train-bevfusion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of dataset directories and annotation files (
.pkl), creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious data is provided. - Ingestion points: Processes external files through parameters like
dataset.root_dirand annotation files defined in the training specification templates (e.g.,kitti_person_infos_train.pkl). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are instructed for the data ingestion process to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities via the
bevfusionandtorchruncommands, allowing for model training, conversion, and evaluation. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or validation routines for the content of annotation files or dataset paths before they are used in command construction.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes a vendor-managed container image from a trusted registry.
- Evidence: References
nvcr.io/nvidia/tao/tao-toolkit:5.5.0-pytfor executing BEVFusion tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill prescribes the execution of shell commands to manage the machine learning lifecycle.
- Evidence: Uses
bevfusion convert,bevfusion train, andtorchrunto execute Python-based training logic within the container environment.
Audit Metadata