tao-train-metric-learning-recognition
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation instructs users to set the environment variable
TORCH_FORCE_NO_WEIGHTS_ONLY_LOAD=1when loading certain checkpoints. Disabling theweights_onlysafety feature in PyTorch allows the deserialization of arbitrary Python objects throughpickle, which can lead to remote code execution if the model checkpoint is malicious. - Evidence (SKILL.md): "For checkpoints produced by the same trusted TAO train/AutoML workflow, set
TORCH_FORCE_NO_WEIGHTS_ONLY_LOAD=1in downstream evaluate, inference, export, or resume/retrain job env vars so Lightning can load the full checkpoint." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous examples and templates for executing shell commands via Docker and the
ml_recogCLI tool. These commands involve mounting host directories and accessing system GPUs, which requires significant privileges. - Evidence (references/tao-deploy-metric-learning-recognition.md): The file contains several
docker run --gpus all --rmcommands targeting thenvcr.io/nvidia/tao/tao-toolkitcontainer registry. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface area for indirect prompt injection by processing external dataset paths (S3 buckets and local directories) and spec files that influence the agent's generated command arguments.
- Ingestion points: Dataset paths interpolated into spec overrides and command lines (
SKILL.md,references/skill_info.yaml). - Boundary markers: None explicitly mentioned for dataset content, though spec files use standard YAML formatting.
- Capability inventory: Execution of Bash commands, Docker containers, and local file read/write via the
ml_recogtool. - Sanitization: None detected for the contents of the datasets or external checkpoints.
Audit Metadata