tao-train-sparse4d
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/normalize_depth_paths.pyuses thepickle.load()function to read annotation data from files provided as command-line arguments. In Python, thepicklemodule is insecure and can execute arbitrary code during deserialization. If an attacker provides a maliciously crafted pickle file (e.g., as part of a dataset), running this script would compromise the environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to execute model training, conversion, and quantization commands (e.g.,sparse4d train,annotations convert). These commands involve interpolating user-provided paths and configuration values. Without strict validation, this pattern presents a potential risk for command injection or execution of unauthorized shell operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface because it is designed to ingest and process external, potentially untrusted datasets and configuration files.
- Ingestion points: Annotation metadata files (.pkl) and H5 files processed by the normalization script.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are used when processing these external data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform arbitrary shell commands via the
Bashtool and write files to the system. - Sanitization: The provided Python utility does not perform sanitization or integrity checks on the pickle data before loading it into memory.
Audit Metadata