vss-ask-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands for service discovery, data retrieval, and text processing.
- Evidence: Employs
curlfor API interactions,jqfor JSON parsing, andpython3for regex-based response cleaning inSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Performs network operations to interact with the VSS agent and VST (Video Storage Toolkit) APIs.
- Evidence: Communication with
http://${HOST_IP}:8000andhttp://${HOST_IP}:30888documented inSKILL.md. These endpoints correspond to the NVIDIA VSS architecture services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating untrusted user queries into the payload of an API call to a downstream AI agent.
- Ingestion points: User queries are embedded into the
input_messagefield of the/generateendpoint call inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly concatenated into the instructional string.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
curl,jq,python3) and perform network requests based on the skill's instructions. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or escaping of the user-supplied query is performed before interpolation.
Audit Metadata