vss-deploy-video-embedding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs service management using
docker composeandcurl. Privileged operations, such as changing host directory ownership, usesudo -nto ensure non-interactive execution, which is a defensive best practice for agent-driven environments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The deployment process pulls container images from NVIDIA's registry (
nvcr.io) and downloads model weights from Hugging Face (huggingface.co). Both are well-known and trusted sources for these assets. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an interface for a service that processes untrusted text and video data, which represents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: REST API endpoints
POST /v1/generate_text_embeddings,POST /v1/generate_video_embeddings, andPOST /v1/filesinreferences/rest-api.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when sending data to these endpoints.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
curlto interact with the service API anddocker composeto manage the service lifecycle. - Sanitization: Absent in the skill instructions, although the service API itself performs schema validation and returns 422 errors for malformed requests.
- [SAFE]: The skill demonstrates secure credential handling by documenting sensitive environment variables (
NGC_API_KEY,HF_TOKEN,REDIS_PASSWORD) and instructing users to manage them via environment variables or secret managers rather than hardcoding them. - [SAFE]: The documentation in
references/rest-api.mdincludes a specific security warning regarding thefile://URI scheme, explaining the risk of arbitrary local file access and providing mitigation guidance via theFILE_URL_ALLOWED_DIRSconfiguration.
Audit Metadata