skills/nvidia/skills/write-dag/Gen Agent Trust Hub

write-dag

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes infrastructure management commands including kubectl for cluster status checks, curl for Airflow API connectivity tests, and make sync-dag for deploying configuration and code to S3. These are standard operations for its stated purpose of DAG orchestration.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates Python scripts (.py) and Kubernetes manifests (.yaml) based on existing reference templates and user requirements. It performs validation using python -c to ensure the generated files are syntactically correct before deployment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-provided pipeline descriptions to generate executable code and prompts.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied pipeline stage sequences and domain-specific prompt requirements (SKILL.md, Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the generated code; the skill relies on the agent following reference guides (prompt-authoring.md) from component skills.
  • Capability inventory: File system writes, kubectl cluster access, Airflow API interaction, and S3 deployment via make commands (SKILL.md, Step 8).
  • Sanitization: The skill mitigates risks by requiring the agent to map user input to a predefined list of shared TaskGroup classes and adapt existing callables rather than writing logic from scratch.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requests a file path for cluster credentials to facilitate kubectl operations. This requirement is disclosed in the skill metadata, and the instructions explicitly warn against logging credential file contents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 11:32 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — write-dag