gitnexus-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
node .gitnexus/run.cjswhen found in the repository target. Because the repository being reviewed is potentially untrusted, this allows for the execution of arbitrary code provided by the code author or PR contributor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npx gitnexusto run the GitNexus CLI tool from the official npm registry as a fallback mechanism. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from GitHub PRs, git diffs, and source files during the review process.
- Ingestion points: The workflow involves reading content from PR URLs, local staged/unstaged changes, and untracked files via
SKILL.mdand associated personas. - Boundary markers: The persona files (e.g.,
ci-adversarial-lens.md,ci-security-lens.md) contain explicit instructions to treat all data in the checkout and diff as "hostile review data" and to never follow instructions found within. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
git,gh(GitHub CLI),node, and a suite of GitNexus MCP tools such asquery,impact, andexplainto analyze the repository. - Sanitization: There is no mention of automated sanitization or filtering of the diff content; security relies on the AI model's adherence to the persona guidelines.
Audit Metadata