flow-define
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple shell scripts located in a specific local directory (
~/.claude-octopus/plugin/scripts/) to check provider status, manage state, and orchestrate external AI models. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to construct and execute shell commands using variables populated from user responses. Specifically, in Step 3, variables such as
user_flowandapproachare interpolated into shell commands, and in Step 4, the user's clarification request is placed directly into a bash command string (orchestrate.sh define "<user's clarification request>"). A user providing input containing shell metacharacters like backticks or semicolons could trigger arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow involves reading and synthesizing output from external AI providers (Codex and Antigravity), creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads discovery findings (
discover_context), prior decisions, and the multi-AI synthesis results (grasp-synthesis-*.md) from the file system (SKILL.md Steps 2 and 5). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or instructions to treat data from external models as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities for shell command execution and file system read/write access.
- Sanitization: Absent. There are no mechanisms defined to validate or escape the content ingested from external providers or user input before it is used in the synthesis process or subsequent commands.
Audit Metadata