skill-work-slicing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external project plans, specifications, or conversation histories which may contain untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through the 'Inputs' section of SKILL.md (plans, specs, or conversation history).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use the bd (beads) and gh (GitHub) CLI tools and to write documentation to docs/roadmaps/.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of input data is described before its use in tool invocations.
  • Mitigation: A mandatory 'Stop Or Checkpoint Rule' requires the agent to 'Confirm the slice list with the user before filing anything,' which provides a human-in-the-loop verification step to prevent the execution of malicious injected content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves the execution of local command-line tools for task tracking.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the use of bd create, bd dep add, and gh tools to create and manage tickets. These commands are standard for project management tasks and are governed by a requirement for user confirmation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 02:45 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-work-slicing