skill-work-slicing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external project plans, specifications, or conversation histories which may contain untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through the 'Inputs' section of
SKILL.md(plans, specs, or conversation history). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use the
bd(beads) andgh(GitHub) CLI tools and to write documentation todocs/roadmaps/. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of input data is described before its use in tool invocations.
- Mitigation: A mandatory 'Stop Or Checkpoint Rule' requires the agent to 'Confirm the slice list with the user before filing anything,' which provides a human-in-the-loop verification step to prevent the execution of malicious injected content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves the execution of local command-line tools for task tracking.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the use ofbd create,bd dep add, andghtools to create and manage tickets. These commands are standard for project management tasks and are governed by a requirement for user confirmation.
Audit Metadata