docs-auditor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves sub-agents analyzing Claude Code session transcripts which contain untrusted user and agent content. This ingestion of external data creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in transcripts could theoretically influence the sub-agents' analysis or recommendations. Ingestion points include the
transcripts.jsonfile processed by the impact, always-on, portfolio, and planner analysts. There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the transcript data. The skill possesses the capability to modify markdown files throughscripts/apply_recommendations.pyand execute shell commands via the coordinator workflow. No sanitization or filtering of the transcript content is performed before it is provided to the agent context. However, the risk is mitigated by the fact that all recommendations must be manually reviewed and confirmed by the user before being applied. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local commands and scripts as part of its auditing process. The
SKILL.mdworkflow uses shell commands for workspace management (mkdir,date) and to launch scripts. Additionally,scripts/collect_docs.pyutilizessubprocess.runto callgit logandgit rev-listto gather documentation freshness data. These operations are scoped to the local environment and the target project directory.
Audit Metadata