sparring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute external command-line interfaces (CLIs) such as
claudeandcodexto facilitate model-vs-model discussions. - The
bin/sparctlscript acts as a controller that invokes these tools based on the user's request. - The
lib/tmux-agent.shscript usestmuxto spawn and manage interactive terminal sessions for the agents. - The
lib/print-agent.shscript executes CLI tools using thetimeoutcommand to manage non-interactive turns. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests user-provided text and data to generate prompts for an 'opponent' AI model.
- Ingestion points: User tasks and conversation history are processed in
SKILL.mdand passed to the sparring harness. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses a structured prompt protocol, it lacks explicit safety delimiters to prevent malicious instructions within the user's data from overriding the sparring protocol instructions.
- Capability inventory: The toolset includes the ability to execute shell commands, manage terminal sessions, and perform file read/write operations in the
/tmp/directory. - Sanitization: The scripts perform basic whitespace normalization for terminal input but do not sanitize the semantic content of the prompts to prevent injection attacks against the secondary model.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill assembles and executes shell commands at runtime to interact with the chosen AI backends.
- In
bin/sparctl, theask-oncecommand constructs a command string by appending a shell-quoted prompt to an agent command and passes it toagent_spawn. - The
agent_spawnfunction inlib/tmux-agent.shexecutes these dynamically constructed command strings within a new tmux session.
Audit Metadata