chat-to-approach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of pasted AI conversation summaries or transcripts, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the parsing and documentation process.
- Ingestion points: Pasted transcripts or conversation summaries provided by the user in Phase 1.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) to isolate the untrusted input from the agent's instructions, nor do they include explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the parsed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading from and writing to the local filesystem (specifically
./docs/approach.md). It also triggers a secondary 'grilling' skill based on the parsed content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, escaping, or validation to ensure the pasted transcript does not contain control sequences or instructional overrides.
Audit Metadata