triage-reflections
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Interacts with a local CLI tool
reflectlocated at~/.claude/bin/reflectto list, mark, and update the status of learnings. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Reads local code snippets (
beforeandafterblocks) and learning descriptions from a local ledger and transmits them to GitHub issues. The skill explicitly includes logic to genericise these snippets (removing private identifiers and path names) when filing to public repositories or global scopes. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the
reflectledger (specifically thetext,before, andafterfields which may originate from code comments or logs). This poses a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in a code comment could influence the agent's routing or merging logic. - Ingestion points: Step 1 loads pending learnings via
reflect marker ls(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Uses a proposal table to prompt the user before filing.
- Capability inventory: Performs
reflect marker marksubprocess calls and network-based issue filing viafile-issue(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Instructions include genericising public-repo issues to remove private identifiers (SKILL.md). This risk is mitigated by the requirement for explicit user acceptance before filing.
Audit Metadata