agentic-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute an installation script from the official domain
https://claude.ai/install.sh. While thecurl | shpattern is high-risk in unknown contexts, the source is a recognized well-known service provider. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines workflows that ingest untrusted external data from Git Pull Requests and source code repositories. This establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested content contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Git PR data via
gh pr checkoutand code analysis using tools likeGrepor@src/references. - Boundary markers: None are specified to delimit external content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, and project-wide file access. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is proposed for handling external data before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions document the usage of shell execution capabilities and immediate command execution syntaxes (e.g.,
!cmd). While these are standard features of the productivity tools being taught, they provide the agent with broad execution power over the local environment.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://claude.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata