find-skills

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md and references/discovery-guide.md direct the agent to execute shell commands using the pnpm and node runtimes to manage skills and run helper scripts.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The core functionality involves downloading and installing executable code from remote Git repositories (GitHub, GitLab, etc.) via the skills CLI. The documentation explicitly recommends using the -y or --yes flag, which bypasses user confirmation prompts, allowing for automated installation of third-party code.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/enrich_find.js script fetches HTML content and metadata from skills.sh and agent-skills.md to enrich search results with human-readable descriptions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and presents untrusted data (skill descriptions) fetched from external web sources to the agent. This introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious skill metadata could influence the agent's subsequent actions.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/enrich_find.js fetches and parses meta tags and paragraph text from remote URLs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant system capabilities, including the ability to install and execute arbitrary code via the skills CLI.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; external descriptions are provided to the agent context without clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Sanitization: The script performs basic HTML tag stripping and entity decoding but lacks semantic validation to prevent malicious instructional content from reaching the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 11:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — find-skills