find-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/discovery-guide.mddirect the agent to execute shell commands using thepnpmandnoderuntimes to manage skills and run helper scripts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The core functionality involves downloading and installing executable code from remote Git repositories (GitHub, GitLab, etc.) via the
skillsCLI. The documentation explicitly recommends using the-yor--yesflag, which bypasses user confirmation prompts, allowing for automated installation of third-party code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/enrich_find.jsscript fetches HTML content and metadata fromskills.shandagent-skills.mdto enrich search results with human-readable descriptions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and presents untrusted data (skill descriptions) fetched from external web sources to the agent. This introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious skill metadata could influence the agent's subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/enrich_find.jsfetches and parses meta tags and paragraph text from remote URLs. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant system capabilities, including the ability to install and execute arbitrary code via the
skillsCLI. - Boundary markers: None identified; external descriptions are provided to the agent context without clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Sanitization: The script performs basic HTML tag stripping and entity decoding but lacks semantic validation to prevent malicious instructional content from reaching the LLM.
Audit Metadata