skills/oakoss/agent-skills/pdf-tools/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf-tools

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides instructions for executing various command-line utilities and local scripts for PDF processing.
  • Evidence: Calls to qpdf, ghostscript (gs), verapdf, and poppler-utils (pdftotext) are documented in references/legacy-utilities.md and references/batch-and-accessibility.md.
  • Evidence: The form-filling workflow in references/form-filling.md references a suite of local Python scripts (e.g., extract_form_field_info.py, fill_fillable_fields.py) for automated document manipulation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses LLMs and vision models to extract data from PDFs, which creates an inherent attack surface for instructions embedded within processed documents.
  • Ingestion points: The extractInvoice and extractComplexTable functions in references/ai-extraction-patterns.md ingest raw text and images extracted from PDFs.
  • Boundary markers: Not explicitly shown in the prompt snippets, though the instructions recommend directing the AI to specific high-value pages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write files (fs.writeFile, doc.save) and execute subprocesses (python scripts/..., qpdf, gs) as part of its document processing pipelines.
  • Sanitization: The skill demonstrates a strong pattern of using Zod schemas to enforce structured output and validate data extracted by AI models, reducing the risk of accidental instruction following.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 08:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pdf-tools