repo-updater
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting documentation outlines an alternative installation method that fetches a shell script from an unverified third-party repository and executes it immediately via a pipe to bash (
curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/repo_updater/main/install.sh?ru_cb=$(date +%s)" | bash). This configuration introduces an untrusted remote code execution vector. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download external scripts from an unverified third-party resource (
Dicklesworthstone/repo_updater) instead of the declared vendor infrastructure or a recognized trusted service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The review system and automated agent-sweep workflows process data from external, potentially untrusted sources which exposes the execution environment to indirect prompt injection hazards.
- Ingestion points: External GitHub issues, pull request content, and uncommitted workspace changes are processed dynamically in
references/review-system.mdandreferences/agent-sweep.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit text boundaries or instructions to isolate raw issue data or code contents from the agent prompt context.
- Capability inventory: The underlying orchestrator possesses high-privilege capabilities including test execution (
pytest,npm test), local script execution via hooks (pre_hook,post_hook), and direct repository modifications (git push). - Sanitization: No pre-processing sanitization, input filtering, or schema validation layers are documented for handling arbitrary issue descriptions or PR content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata