animating-with-code
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches a third-party repository from
https://github.com/JohnHeibel/ClaudeAnimationBaseusinggit clone. It also installs several Node.js packages (p5,p5.brush,puppeteer-core) from the NPM registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to execute code from the downloaded repository (
node render.mjs) to render animation frames. Although a specific commit hash (0ac8bf2) is provided for verification, the code originates from a non-trusted external source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses several shell commands to manage the animation environment, including
git clone,npm install,sedfor file modification,chownfor permission changes, andffprobefor file verification. It specifically directs execution through ascripts/jail.shsandbox. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves writing drawing code (p5.js) that is executed at runtime via a headless browser to generate video frames.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires reading and following an external API guide (
ANIMATION_GUIDE.md) from the cloned repository. This creates a surface where instructions within the external guide could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
ANIMATION_GUIDE.md(cloned fromJohnHeibel/ClaudeAnimationBaseat runtime). - Boundary markers: None explicitly used when reading the external guide.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (
git clone,npm install,node,ffprobe), file modification (sed), and file system access. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the external guide content before processing.
Audit Metadata