building-github-index

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts scripts/github_index.py and scripts/pk_index.py fetch repository source data as tarballs from the GitHub API (api.github.com). This is standard functionality for a repository indexing tool using a well-known service.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from external repositories and includes it in a generated index file.
  • Ingestion points: Repository file content is read and processed in scripts/github_index.py and scripts/pk_index.py to extract headings, YAML metadata, and code symbols.
  • Boundary markers: None; extracted content is placed directly into markdown tables or lists without delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests to the GitHub API and write files to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: No security-focused filtering is performed on the extracted strings, allowing potentially malicious instructions in a repository to enter the agent's context.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scans flagged a pattern of piping curl output to python3. Analysis confirms this is a benign command template provided in the documentation for decoding Base64 file content from the GitHub API. The Python code is a static one-liner that performs only data transformation and does not execute the content of the downloaded files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents/PATH?ref={ref} - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 06:49 PM