building-github-index
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts
scripts/github_index.pyandscripts/pk_index.pyfetch repository source data as tarballs from the GitHub API (api.github.com). This is standard functionality for a repository indexing tool using a well-known service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from external repositories and includes it in a generated index file.
- Ingestion points: Repository file content is read and processed in
scripts/github_index.pyandscripts/pk_index.pyto extract headings, YAML metadata, and code symbols. - Boundary markers: None; extracted content is placed directly into markdown tables or lists without delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests to the GitHub API and write files to the local file system.
- Sanitization: No security-focused filtering is performed on the extracted strings, allowing potentially malicious instructions in a repository to enter the agent's context.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scans flagged a pattern of piping
curloutput topython3. Analysis confirms this is a benign command template provided in the documentation for decoding Base64 file content from the GitHub API. The Python code is a static one-liner that performs only data transformation and does not execute the content of the downloaded files.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/contents/PATH?ref={ref} - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata