tree-sitting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill bundles multiple pre-compiled ELF shared libraries in the
parsers/directory (e.g.,libtree_sitter_html.so,libtree_sitter_python.so). These are dynamically loaded at runtime usingctypes.CDLLwithinscripts/engine.pyto provide language-specific parsing functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The test suite, specifically
tests/test_cli_cache.py, utilizessubprocess.runto execute the CLI tool during integration testing. While primarily for development, this patterns allows for shell command execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse third-party codebases, which constitutes a significant attack surface. Malicious instructions could be embedded in code comments or docstrings within a repository being explored. When the agent retrieves these symbols or source snippets, it may inadvertently follow instructions contained within that untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: Codebase files read into memory via
CodeCache.scanandCodeCache.referencesinscripts/engine.py. - Boundary markers: Extracted symbol signatures and docstrings are returned to the agent without specific delimiters or isolation instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can read files, search symbols, and find references across the filesystem root.
- Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on extracted docstrings or comments before they are presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata