tree-sitting

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill bundles multiple pre-compiled ELF shared libraries in the parsers/ directory (e.g., libtree_sitter_html.so, libtree_sitter_python.so). These are dynamically loaded at runtime using ctypes.CDLL within scripts/engine.py to provide language-specific parsing functionality.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The test suite, specifically tests/test_cli_cache.py, utilizes subprocess.run to execute the CLI tool during integration testing. While primarily for development, this patterns allows for shell command execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse third-party codebases, which constitutes a significant attack surface. Malicious instructions could be embedded in code comments or docstrings within a repository being explored. When the agent retrieves these symbols or source snippets, it may inadvertently follow instructions contained within that untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: Codebase files read into memory via CodeCache.scan and CodeCache.references in scripts/engine.py.
  • Boundary markers: Extracted symbol signatures and docstrings are returned to the agent without specific delimiters or isolation instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can read files, search symbols, and find references across the filesystem root.
  • Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on extracted docstrings or comments before they are presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 27, 2026, 08:49 AM