dockerfile-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/extract_dockerfile_blocks.pyutilizesimportlib.utilto dynamically load theanalyze_dockerfilemodule from a path constructed at runtime (Path(__file__).resolve().parent / 'analyze_dockerfile.py'). While this is a standard local development pattern for testing and CI, it constitutes dynamic loading of executable content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and analyze untrusted user data (Dockerfiles and Compose files), which represents a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied files are ingested by
scripts/analyze_dockerfile.pyandscripts/analyze_compose.pyfor static analysis. - Boundary markers: The analysis scripts treat inputs strictly as text for linting and do not incorporate user instructions directly into the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The analyzer scripts are limited to text processing and stdout output; they do not perform network operations, file writes, or sensitive subprocess calls.
- Sanitization:
scripts/analyze_compose.pyusesyaml.safe_load()to prevent unsafe deserialization of YAML content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mddirect the agent to execute internal Python scripts usinguv runand run external utilities such asnpx dclintandhadolintvia Docker. These commands are necessary and expected for the skill's primary function. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to downloading the
uvinstaller fromastral.shand utilizing container images fromghcr.ioand Docker Hub (e.g.,hadolint/hadolint). These sources are well-known, reputable services in the software development ecosystem.
Audit Metadata