skills/obra/muse-skills/instagram/Gen Agent Trust Hub

instagram

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Instagram, such as captions, comments, and profile information, which may contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from Instagram posts, reels, and user profiles using instagram-cli, hatch-zeitgeist, and browser tasks (referenced in SKILL.md and references/content-questions.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill provides instructions to distinguish between "guesses" and "verified facts" and to report what could not be verified, although no explicit structural data delimiters are defined.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute commands via exec (including instagram-cli, hatch-zeitgeist, and ffmpeg), perform network requests to Meta/Instagram domains, and write files to the ~/workspace/ directory.
  • Sanitization: The agent is instructed to manually verify machine-generated annotations and is strictly prohibited from performing write actions, such as posting content or profile updates, without explicit user consent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the exec command to run various CLI tools to perform its tasks.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/content-questions.md direct the agent to run instagram-cli, hatch-zeitgeist, and ffmpeg with arguments derived from user input, such as Instagram URLs and media IDs. The instruction templates include quoting for variables (e.g., '<exact supplied URL>') which helps mitigate common command injection risks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:45 PM