slack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from Slack which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the AI agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like
messages.read,channels.read, andsearch.readdefined inmanifest.yaml. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not explicitly specify the use of delimiters (like XML tags or markdown blocks) to isolate content from Slack from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform mutations via the
writeactions inmanifest.yaml, includingmessages.send,messages.schedule, andcanvases.updatethrough theslack call-toolcommand. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of specific sanitization or filtering logic applied to Slack content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata