writing-lane-briefs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to gather information from potentially untrusted sources such as git logs, issue comments, and repository code to generate a lane brief for another agent to execute. Malicious instructions embedded in these sources could be inadvertently included in the generated brief.
- Ingestion points: git log, codebase excerpts, issue comments, and PR descriptions.
- Boundary markers: The brief uses a structured template but lacks explicit instructions to ignore or sanitize embedded commands within the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The downstream lane agent is granted capabilities to execute shell commands, perform database operations, and run tests.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is required before interpolation into the brief.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions and templates involve executing various shell commands such as git log, git rev-parse, npx prisma generate, and custom lint/test commands. These provide a functional surface for command execution that could be exploited if malicious input is injected via the indirect paths described above.
Audit Metadata