internal-comms-anthropic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow of processing untrusted data from multiple internal communication channels.\n
- Ingestion points: The files
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdinstruct the agent to gather data from Slack messages, emails, Google Drive documents, and Calendar events.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between the skill's instructions and the content being retrieved from external sources.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill encourages the agent to use its tool-access capabilities to read sensitive company communications and synthesize them into public-facing documents (newsletters, FAQs).\n
- Sanitization: There are no guidelines provided for the agent to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from external tools before including it in the generated communication.
Audit Metadata