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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external data from call transcripts and emails, which constitutes a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from calls, emails, and deals as described in
references/task-method.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions emphasize structural adherence to templates (
objections-output.md,overview-output.md) but do not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore hidden commands within the ingested transcripts. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to execute workspace mutations and public hosting operations as outlined in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: No specific data sanitization or escaping mechanisms for external transcript data are documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes platform-provided tools to interact with the environment and process data.
- Evidence: References to
workspace-mutations.mdandhost-runtime.mdindicate the skill is configured to use authorized platform tools for data retrieval and state management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references shared configuration and logic files using relative paths within the platform's file system.
- Evidence: Accesses files such as
../shared/gtm-context.md,../shared/output-readiness.md, and../../shared/analytics-contract.md. These are vendor-owned shared resources rather than untrusted external downloads.
Audit Metadata