skills/octavehq/lfgtm/insights/Gen Agent Trust Hub

insights

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external data from call transcripts and emails, which constitutes a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Processes content from calls, emails, and deals as described in references/task-method.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions emphasize structural adherence to templates (objections-output.md, overview-output.md) but do not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore hidden commands within the ingested transcripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to execute workspace mutations and public hosting operations as outlined in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: No specific data sanitization or escaping mechanisms for external transcript data are documented.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes platform-provided tools to interact with the environment and process data.
  • Evidence: References to workspace-mutations.md and host-runtime.md indicate the skill is configured to use authorized platform tools for data retrieval and state management.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references shared configuration and logic files using relative paths within the platform's file system.
  • Evidence: Accesses files such as ../shared/gtm-context.md, ../shared/output-readiness.md, and ../../shared/analytics-contract.md. These are vendor-owned shared resources rather than untrusted external downloads.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 07:24 PM