signals
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from CRM records and interaction histories, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: As described in
references/task-method.md, the skill ingests "active-opportunity roster", "stage history", "earlier communication", and "Motion/cell narratives" from external systems. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore or isolate instructions potentially embedded in the CRM fields or communication transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute a local Python script for state management and can transition to other agent skills based on the analyzed data.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering procedures for the ingested data are defined in the skill logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local utility script to manage its persistence and internal state tracking.
- Evidence:
references/briefing-output-template.mdspecifies the use of../../shared/scripts/workspace_state.pyto store detector results and observation history.
Audit Metadata