blog-humanize-fast

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script workflows/blog-humanize-fast.js constructs a Bash command by interpolating the inputPath and quickRulesPath arguments without sanitization. The prompt instructs the agent to execute a command containing LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8 wc -m < "${A.inputPath}". An attacker can provide a crafted path (e.g., "; malicious_command; #") to execute arbitrary shell commands with the agent's privileges.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The command injection vulnerability enables an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive local data, such as environment variables, private keys, or system configurations, to an external server.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input (blog drafts) and interpolates it into prompts for rewriting and fidelity validation. Although it uses delimiters like <<<CHUNK, it remains susceptible to indirect prompt injection where malicious content within the text draft attempts to override the agent's instructions or bypass the verification logic.
  • Ingestion points: Content provided through A.inputPath or A.text in workflows/blog-humanize-fast.js.
  • Boundary markers: Uses <<<CHUNK, <<<DOC, <<<A, <<<B, and <<<RULES delimiters to separate code and content.
  • Capability inventory: The script has the capability to invoke Read and Bash tools via the agent() function and performs multi-step reasoning cycles.
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping is applied to the input content before it is interpolated into the agent prompts.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 06:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — blog-humanize-fast