Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve downloading the
gogclibinary from GitHub (openclaw/gogcli). The source is a well-known service and the version is pinned for verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is authorized to execute
gogcommands via the Bash tool (gog:*) to interact with Google Workspace services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Google Workspace, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
gog gmail get,gog drive download,gog docs cat, andgog sheets get(specified in SKILL.md and referenced documentation). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or warnings for the agent to distinguish between its instructions and untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform actions like
gog gmail sendandgog drive share(detailed in references/permissions.md), which could be abused if the agent follows malicious instructions found in ingested data. - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization or filtering of retrieved API data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata