seo-images

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill determines the path for its utility scripts at runtime by reading the suite_root value from a local .seo-suite-runtime.json file or by using the CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT environment variable. This path is then used to construct shell commands for execution.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/markdown-delivery-contract.md describe how to resolve <suite-root> and use it to execute scripts located in the scripts/ directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to run Python scripts for task validation, site management, and workflow initialization.
  • Evidence: Commands such as python "<suite-root>/scripts/validate_seo_findings.py", python "<suite-root>/scripts/manage_markdown_site.py", and python "<suite-root>/scripts/manage_markdown_work.py" are called across SKILL.md and references/markdown-delivery-contract.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, such as rendered web pages and asset inventories, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill requires rendered pages, asset inventories, and source URLs as inputs (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions defining specific delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested external data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write various project files (e.g., image-review.md, index.md, seo-findings.json) and execute local Python scripts (SKILL.md, references/markdown-delivery-contract.md).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any methods for sanitizing, escaping, or filtering the external content before it is processed or used in script arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 05:26 AM