prd-generator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for directory management and document conversion.
mkdir -p ./prd_outputs/[Project Name]/in Step 6a.npx md-to-pdf "./prd_outputs/[Project Name]/[project_name]_PRD.md"in Step 6c.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The shell commands in Step 6 interpolate the
[Project Name]variable, which is derived directly from user input in Step 3. There are no sanitization steps or instructions to handle shell-sensitive characters (like semicolons, backticks, or quotes), creating a risk where a malicious user could provide a project name that executes arbitrary shell commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto fetch and run themd-to-pdfpackage from the public npm registry. Whilemd-to-pdfis a known utility, fetching and executing code at runtime from an external registry introduces a dependency on external infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (product concepts) to generate a structured PRD that is intended to be fed into other AI coding tools.
- Ingestion points: The user's initial product description and subsequent answers to up to 7 clarifying questions.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided in the generation logic.
- Capability inventory: File system write access, directory creation (
mkdir), and shell execution vianpx. - Sanitization: No sanitization of user-provided strings is mentioned before they are interpolated into the generated markdown or shell commands.
Audit Metadata