codex-cu
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several local shell commands for its core functionality. It uses
osascriptto query Google Chrome tabs for instance identification,psandpgrepto identify the parent application of the ChatGPT extension, andopento launch applications or URLs on the host system. The installation script usesjqto modify local configuration files. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
install-codex-cu.shscript registers the MCP server at the user scope by modifying configuration files for Claude Code (~/.claude.json) and Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json). This ensures the tool remains available across agent sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a Computer Use bridge, the skill ingests untrusted data from application accessibility trees and browser DOM snapshots. Ingestion points include
getAXState()for native apps anddomSnapshot()for web pages. There are no explicit boundary markers enforced by the proxy scripts. The capability inventory is high, including application control, browser manipulation, and JavaScript execution. Sanitization is not present, as the skill acts as a transparent bridge. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within target browser tabs and provides high-level UI automation through the
cua_replMCP server. It also usesos.execvpeto launch the underlying plugin binary dynamically.
Audit Metadata