second-model-consensus
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates consensus by sending project artifacts, live files, and proposals to external models (including Gemini and Claude) using platform-specific tmux tools (
codex-tmux,agy-tmux). This represents a data flow where local repository content is shared with well-known model providers for the purpose of cross-model review. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an adversarial review loop where a fresh model reads untrusted proposals or diffs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The reviewer model is directed to read repo paths, artifact paths, and specific proposed diffs/claims provided in the consensus round prompt (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The round-prompt skeleton provides structural instructions (e.g., writing to a specific
result.jsonpath and restricting further delegation) which offer some process isolation, though it lacks explicit instructions for the reviewer to disregard commands contained within the data being audited. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
codex-tmux,agy-tmux, andtmux-agent-dialogueto dispatch tasks to other models and writes consensus reports to a scratchpad file. - Sanitization: No specific content filtering or sanitization of the input diffs or artifacts is mentioned before they are presented to the reviewer model.
Audit Metadata