shared-memory-intake
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes 'reusable knowledge' claims submitted by agents that are later consolidated into a shared memory store.
- Ingestion points: Files written to
~/.agents/shared-memory-inbox/pending/are the primary entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: YAML frontmatter is used to separate metadata from the natural language content of the submission.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write to memory files, execute Python scripts, and perform network operations via
scp. - Sanitization: A validation script (
validate_submission.py) performs schema checks and identifies common secret patterns (API keys, private keys), but does not sanitize the claim body for prompt injection payloads. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to use various shell commands for its core logic.
- Evidence: Uses
mkdirandrmdirto implement a file-based lock mechanism (.curator.lock). - Evidence: Executes the
scripts/validate_submission.pyscript usingpython3. - Evidence: Commands the use of
scpto transfer consolidated notes to other systems. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the movement of processed data to external hosts.
- Evidence: The curation process includes a step to
scpmemory notes to remote hosts specified in theevidence_hostmetadata field, which could be used to transmit internal memory contents to arbitrary network locations.
Audit Metadata