using-grok-bot-app
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from the 'Grok Bot' application's interface, specifically message transcripts and sidebar previews.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
agent-browser evalinSKILL.mdto extract text from DOM elements ([role=group][aria-label$="message"]and[aria-label="Bot list"]). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to treat the extracted text as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell commands via
Bash(pkill, open, lsof, pgrep) and the ability to interact with the application's DOM viaagent-browser(click, eval). - Sanitization: Extracted text is subjected to basic whitespace collapsing and character slicing (
.slice(0,200)), but no semantic sanitization is applied to prevent instruction injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform process management tasks to enable remote debugging. This includes using
pgrepto check for the process,pkillto terminate it, andopen -awith specific arguments (--remote-debugging-port=9231) to restart it with an open debugging port. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill extracts private user information, including a roster of bots, their UUIDs, activity timestamps, and message history, into the agent's context for processing.
Audit Metadata