The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). * Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read potentially untrusted data from specification and requirement documents located in the .claude/context/ directory as part of Phase 1 in SKILL.md. * Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the documents being critiqued. * Capability inventory: The skill is configured with Read, Write, Edit, Glob, and Grep tools and performs file-write and edit operations to modify specifications based on its analysis, as detailed in Phase 4 of SKILL.md. * Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or escaping of content read from external files before it is processed by the agent's reasoning logic.
[SAFE]: No confirmed malicious patterns, hardcoded credentials, unauthorized network operations, or persistence mechanisms were detected. The included Node.js scripts and hooks are basic scaffolds used for project structure and do not contain executable malicious logic.

spec-critique