extract-template

SUSPICIOUS. The skill’s document-processing capabilities fit its stated purpose, and the PyMuPDF install is consistent with official usage, but the execution trust is weakened by unpinned installs, an opaque pandoc bootstrap script, and especially npx execution of a package chosen through CLI_PKG_URL before publishing source documents. The main risk is supply-chain and credential/data forwarding through the external CLI, not clear malicious intent.

SUSPICIOUS. The core PDF-processing behavior matches the stated purpose, but install and publish trust are only partly verifiable: PyMuPDF is normal, while pandoc bootstrap and especially npx --package=${CLI_PKG_URL} introduce meaningful supply-chain uncertainty. The skill also sends the source PDF and generated package to a remote service, which is expected for publishing but still sensitive.

No clear malicious behavior is present. This is an installer for Pandoc, but it trusts downloaded release archives without integrity verification and uses tar extraction without explicit path validation. A compromised or substituted archive could cause files to be written outside the destination and execute attacker-controlled code.

No clear malicious behavior is evident. This is an installer for Pandoc, but archive path traversal and the absence of integrity verification are meaningful security risks if the downloaded artifact or its source is compromised.