averlo-motion-studio
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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
esbuildto compile choreography scripts (e.g.,src/minimal.tsorsrc/v15.ts) into temporary modules, which are then dynamically imported and executed by helper scripts during validation. - Evidence:
assets/starter/scripts/check-geometry.mjsandassets/starter/scripts/check-visibility.mjsusebuildfromesbuildto generate a temporary file and then callawait import(pathToFileURL(tmp))to execute the compiled code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions for the agent to perform self-updates by fetching and merging code from a remote Git repository.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/updates.mdinstruct the agent to usegit fetchandgit pullfromhttps://github.com/olafBobryk/averlo-tool-motion-studio.git. This is identified as a vendor-owned resource. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of various shell commands for project setup, dependency management, and media rendering.
- Evidence:
README.mdandSKILL.mdlist commands such aspython3 scripts/create_project.py,npm ci,npm run render, and Git operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied image assets to generate motion films, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection through data ingestion.
- Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: User-supplied PNG images and SVG marks (e.g.,
frame-01.png,averlo-mark.svg) are loaded into the project environment. - Boundary markers: No explicit prompt delimiters or warnings for treating data as untrusted are provided.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system operations, dynamic code execution, network operations (Git updates), and browser-based rendering.
- Sanitization:
scripts/create_project.pyperforms basic validation of PNG headers and image dimensions.
Audit Metadata