review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from git diffs, commit logs, and external issue trackers (Linear and GitHub), creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters context via
git diff,git log,gh issue view,mcp__linear__get_issue, and reading local files such as.claude/plans/*/plan.mdand spec files. - Boundary markers: The instructions provide some operational scope (e.g., "Focus on NEW code") but lack explicit delimiters or instructions for sub-agents to disregard potential malicious directives embedded in the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to spawn multiple sub-agents (
TaskCreate), write files to the project's.claudedirectory (Write), execute development tools (mix compile,mix test), and interact with the user (AskUserQuestion). - Sanitization: No evidence of explicit sanitization, validation, or escaping of the requirements text or diff data is present before interpolation into prompts for the specialized agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to perform code verification and repository operations.
- Evidence: The skill uses
gitfor diffing and logging,mkdirfor directory setup, and a complex shell pipeline for Elixir verification:mix compile --warnings-as-errors && mix format --check-formatted $(git diff --name-only HEAD~5 | grep '\.exs\?$' | tr '\n' ' ') && mix credo --strict && mix test. - Note: The shell pipeline uses command substitution
$(...)to process file lists from the repository, which is a common pattern in development skills but relies on the integrity of the local git environment.
Audit Metadata